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I am grateful for Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's careful and extensive 
commentary on my book. His commentary is rich and wide-ranging, so 
I must confine myself to just some of the points he raises. 
Let  me start with a word about meanings and normative facts. 
Sinnott-Armstrong distinguishes what there really is, on the one hand, 
from what we believe and mean. I could hardly reject the distinction: It 
indeed is one thing to ask whether there really are normative facts, and 
another to ask whether we believe that there are --  and whether our 
normative statements mean that certain normative facts obtain. Still, I 
think we should be charitable enough with ourselves to see the two 
questions as related. It's a chief aim of my book to argue that if we 
didn't believe in normative facts, we could coherently go on talking and 
thinking, normatively, pretty much as we do talk and think. If, then, we 
convince ourselves that the world doesn't contain normative facts, why 
accuse ourselves of having been in error? If we've been talking pretty 
much as we should in a world without normative facts, and thinking 
pretty much as we should in a world without normative facts, why not 
pat ourselves on the back and say we've been talking and thinking 
pretty much correctly? 
I'm not, then, proposing a blanket reform in our normative thought 
and talk. I am proposing that some of us philosophers should change 
what we say about normative thought and talk. I'm proposing that there 
are limits to the analogy between ought-statements and statements that 
less problematically aspire to state facts. I 'm proposing that the best 
way to theorize about normative thought and talk is not to revel in this 
analogy, but to look more closely at normative psychology and sociol- 
ogy, and draw on logical analogies with imperatives. 
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1. EXPRESSIVISM AND MIXED THEORIES 
My own view of normative language is expressivistic. Normative state- 
ments express states of mind -- "normative judgments", we can call 
them -- and the way to explain what normative statements mean is to 
say what normative judgments are like. They are not, I claim, best 
explained as states of belief in facts that are somehow normative; they 
are best treated in another way. 
Sinnott-Armstrong asks why I don't go for a mixed theory of norma- 
tive language, partly descriptivistic, partly expressivistic. Why don't I 
think that normative statements do two things at once: state facts, and 
also express states of mind that aren't factual beliefs. A part of the 
answer is just that I'm not sure how such a mixed theory is supposed to 
work. Some normative terms do clearly involve an interplay of descrip- 
tive and non-descriptive factors. In a recent paper I take up the word 
'lewd' as an example (Gibbard, 1992b). Its meaning combines descriptive 
elements -- the notion of sexual display -- with normative elements that 
I interpret as non-descriptive. But this interplay, I find, is none too 
simple, and in the case of general moral terms like 'wrong', I don't seem 
to need it. An expressivistic analysis seems to do the job by itself. 1 
What would the descriptive part of a mixed theory be supposed to 
accomplish? My opponents, Sinnott-Armstrong says, are driven to 
include descriptivist elements in their analyses by the need to explain 
such things as modus ponens. I say one doesn't need descriptivist 
elements to do this, and if one did, they wouldn't manage the job. Think 
of emotive discourse: From "Yea for all Greeks" and "Socrates is a 
Greek" follows "Yea for Socrates". To say this, we don't have to 
suppose that "Yea for" has a descriptive meaning. And with mixed 
emotive-descriptive language, validity doesn't seem to be settled by the 
validity of arguments couched in descriptive language. We can see this 
with racial epithets that we, as decent people, would reject. Take 
"nigger": The term seems to mix description and emotional expression. 
Suppose, then, a racist reasons this way: Premise: "King had dark- 
skinned African ancestry." First consequence: "King was a nigger!" And 
let the next inference be just to "King!" said in a tone expressing hatred. 
The initial premise seems uncontroversial, but then I want to object to 
the reasoning at the first inference, where the pejorative expression 
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kicks in. Why do I find the statement "King was a nigger" totally 
unacceptable? Partly, because accepting it would seem to commit me to 
hating King on account of his race -- and I reject and abhor such 
hatred. If, though, I thought that logic follows the descriptive com- 
ponent, I'd think that in accepting the premise "King had dark-skinned 
African ancestry", I was committed to accepting the first inference in 
this chain of reasoning, and so accepting "King was a nigger". Things 
don't seem to work this way. 
Still, as Sinnott-Armstrong points out, normative logic can be much 
more complicated than the emotive logic I've just been using as a test. I 
myself end up with a rather complex account of normative logic, and 
Sinnott-Armstrong asks whether the theory that results is still in any 
way expressivistic. Fair question! Of course the normative logic itself 
isn't distinctively expressivistic, since I was trying to show that on a 
theory like mine, ordinary logic would apply. But in a real sense too, 
the theory, once it has undergone this transformation, is no longer 
expressivistic. Neither, though, is it descriptivistic. The meaning of a 
normative statement, I say, is a matter of the combinations of norms 
and descriptions the statement rules out. I don't, then, directly charac- 
terize all the states of mind that can be expressed by normative state- 
ments. Rather, many of them I characterize indirectly, by the inferential 
relations they stand in. Some of the states in this inferential web are 
states of what I call normative governance: a special kind of tendency to 
do (or believe or feel) what a normative dictate tells you to do (or 
believe or feel). It is this special inferential tie to normative governance, 
I claim, that distinguishes normative statements from purely descriptive 
statements. 
I could call my position, then, a "loose" expressivism rather than a 
strict one. A strict expressivist for normative language would provide a 
more or less direct characterization of a state of mind all such language 
expresses: the state of mind isn't a belief, but an emotion, say, or a state 
of accepting norms. As a loose expressivist, I take such a state of mind 
as explanatorily basic. In this, I 'm unlike a descriptivist, who takes 
something quite different as explanatorily basic -- namely facts (or 
putative facts) that somehow, if they obtained, would constitute norma- 
tive facts --  and who then explains normative judgments as beliefs in 
these normative facts. What I myself take as explanatorily basic is a 
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state that goes with normative governance. We might call this state 
accepting a normative directive: a normative requirement that applies to 
oneself fight now. (At points in the book, I make it sound as if the 
explanatorily basic state is accepting a system of norms, but I see now 
that I should have treated normative directives as basic.) Only a limited 
range of normative language, though, expresses the speaker's accept- 
ance of normative directives. The states of mind expressed by norma- 
tive statements outside this limited range are to be explained by their 
inferential relations to this explanatorily basic kind of state. 
What is distinctive, then, about all expressivism, strict or loose, is an 
order of explanation: one begins with a special kind of psychic state 
which is not to be explained as straight belief in some peculiarly 
normative kind of fact. In my own case, I begin with the state of mind: 
accepting a normative directive that applies to oneself right now. And I 
explain the states of mind expressed by a wider class normative state- 
ments by their inferential relations to this explanatorily basic kind of 
state of mind .2 
2. NORMATIVE INTERNALISM AND 
DESCRIPTIVISTIC THEORIES 
That brings me to the set of issues that go under the name "inter- 
nalism". We both agree that normative convictions are closely tied to 
motivation. But this tie might be like the one between believing that it's 
raining and being motivated to carry an umbrella. I myself claim that 
the tie is of a different kind: that it is a matter of meaning. Barring 
special states -- despondency, say, or exhaustion -- you can't be said to 
accept that you rationally must do something without having some 
motivation to do it. This motivational tendency might be outweighed by 
enticements to the contrary; weakness of will provides no counter- 
example to this version of internalism.3 
What, then, of complete but unprincipled indifference to rationality? 
Well, as I think about it now, I do want to admit that in depressed or 
abnormal states of mind, the dictates of normative governance might be 
rendered totally ineffective motivationally. That's still consistent with 
the rest of what I want to say: that normative judgments are best 
characterized by their logical ties to a state that is normally motivating 
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--  to a state of having decided what to do or what to believe or how to 
feel, in so far as discussion and reasoning can decide such things. 
Still, in normal states of mind, I'm saying, I don't  sincerely believe 
that a kind of act is wrong if I have no tendency to feel guilty upon 
performing acts of that kind. This tendency may be outweighed, but it 
has to be there. Sinnott-Armstrong asks, then, can't I accept that it's 
wrong, say, not to report  betting income on my tax return, and still have 
no tendency at all to feel guilty when I don't? 
I'm not convinced I can. Suppose neither of us reports our betting 
income, and neither of us has the least tendency to feel guilty for not 
doing so. (Perhaps we're both on principle indifferent to moral con- 
siderations.) You, though, think that we're acting wrongly, morally, in 
not reporting our betting income, whereas I don't. You think it is 
morally wrong to disobey the law, whether or not anyone else obeys it. 
I think it would be morally wrong to disobey the law only if we thereby 
became free riders on others' moral restraint. We both agree on what 
the income tax laws say, and we both agree that virtually no one reports 
informal gambling earnings. So in what do we disagree? Is it just in the 
application of a word? You have no tendency at all to feel guilty for not 
reporting your betting income. You have no tendency to resent others 
who don't  report  betting income. What's at stake in whether you 
convince me? Aren't  we just going through the forms of a moral 
dispute, using the word 'wrong' with no meaning? 
We can say that we take a great theoretical interest in moral right 
and wrong, even though deciding an act is wrong or not makes no 
difference to how we think it makes sense to feel about the act. But 
isn't this a theory without a real subject matter? We can say that we're 
trying to explain our patterns of judgment in a principled way. But our 
judgments seem to take different patterns, and perhaps either of us can 
find principles to match his judgments, if we bother to play that game. 
Are we therefore just signifying different things by the word 'wrong', so 
that our disagreement is only apparent? What would make this moral 
disagreement genuine, it seems to me, is the normal tie to sentiments of 
guilt and resentment. Then something would be at stake, namely how to 
feel about the non-reporting of betting income. 
Of course I can adopt a principled indifference to the kinds of 
considerations other people treat as moral - -  without drawing too fine a 
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line about what those considerations are, and how they legitimately 
weigh in judgments of moral rightness and wrongness. What I can't do, 
in that case, is to enter into moral disputes the way other people can. If 
I use the term 'morally wrong' to apply to things most people regard as 
wrong, I'm then not using the term 'wrong' to mean what they do. I 
can't then have meaningful, fine-grained moral convictions on matters 
of moral controversy. 4 
Still, with English terms like 'wrong' or 'irrational', meanings are 
bound to be controversial. Whether 'ought'-judgments and the like are 
tied to normative governance by the meaning of the English term 
'ought' won't be entirely clear as a matter of actual English usage. The 
more important question, though, is not how our language currently 
works, but how to sharpen it. Shall we purge it of all non-descriptive 
elements and work to make sure that all our words have agreed truth 
conditions? Or shall we cultivate language also that has an analytic tie 
to normative governance? Shall we discuss and reason only about how 
things are factually? Or shall we cultivate the linguistic resources to 
discuss also how to act and think and feel in a wide variety of 
situations? 
With the issue put this way, I myself will extol the advantages of the 
latter kind of reasoning and discussion. I'll sketch how we can think of 
past, future, hypothetical, and even fictional cases, and decide together, 
hypothetically, what to do or to think or to feel in such cases. I'll show 
how this constitutes a kind of rehearsal for situations that may come up 
as we live our lives together. I'll stress the advantages of not restricting 
in advance the kinds of considerations that can be put forth in such 
discussion. Descriptivistic opponents will claim for their side the 
advantages of getting all meanings tied down to facts. I'll say I welcome 
having meanings tied down to facts, and indeed I can welcome all the 
clear, descriptive meanings they can invent. Still, I'll say, we need my 
other kinds of meanings too --  and if any meanings distinctively merit 
being called normative, isn't it meanings analytically tied to normative 
governance in this way? 
3. N O R M S  OF R A T I O N A L I T Y  A N D  O T H E R  N O R M S  
Let me turn now to the question of what distinguishes various different 
kinds of norms. I myself say that all norms are, at base, norms of 
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rationality. So what makes a norm a norm of morality, say, or a norm of 
politeness? Different kinds of norms, I answer, concern the rationality 
of different kinds of things. Moral norms, for instance, concern the 
rationality not of actions directly, but of moral sentiments toward 
actions. 
Now Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that this won't work for such special- 
purpose norms as norms of politeness. What, on my theory, would it 
mean to say such things as, "It's not impolite to smoke in private"? The 
person who says this, I claim, expresses his acceptance or norms, but 
not norms governing private smoking directly. He expresses his accept- 
ance of norms governing some kind of reaction to smoking in private. 
So it 's perfectly consistent to say, "It 's not impolite to smoke in private, 
but it is irrational." This expresses one's acceptance of norms that 
forbid smoking, but also forbid certain emotional reactions to smoking 
- -  reactions, we might say informally, that constitute experiencing 
private smoking as rude. 
But what are these reactions? I should say first, I 'm talking about 
someone who is using talk of politeness normatively. As with morality, 
a person can use seemingly normative terms sociologically, describing 
convictions by mouthing them -- just as a historian who wants to 
describe early modern witchcraft beliefs without buying into them can 
say things like "Witches had sexual intercourse with the devil." In a like 
vein I might say, "It isn't polite for a woman to reveal herself as brighter 
than the man she's with." If I said this, I assure you, I'd be speaking at 
most sociologically, nor normatively! 
What am I doing, then, when I speak normatively in terms of polite- 
ness -- when I buy into standards of politeness? (Of course as Philippa 
Foot says, I'll still want to allow that at times, a little rudeness is in 
place. 5) To call behavior impolite is to express norms governing a 
reaction to it, I'm saying, but what reaction? Well, I don't imagine we'll 
get a terribly precise analysis of what the term 'impolite' means, 
whether my way or anyone else's. To get in the right ballpark, though, 
we'd have to be more sensitive to the role of politeness --  in the 
sociological sense --  than has been good intellectual form in the last 
couple of centuries. 6 We'd have to be pretty Goffman-like, v or take 
Confucian treatments of etiquette seriously. 8 We'd have to recognize 
how much of the processing power of our brains is devoted to our 
standing without other people. We'd have to think about the roles that 
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emotions of respect and disrespect, offense, humiliation, and the like 
play in human life. 
As a first stab, I'd say this: When we discuss politeness and impolite- 
ness normatively, we're working out when to be offended and when not 
to be. (I think the feelings associated with normal, polite conversation 
amount to more than lack of offense, but we don't seem to have a name 
for our reaction to normal social reassurance and affirmation.) Perhaps 
the best thing to say, then, is that impolite acts are acts that prima facie 
warrant feelings of offense. I say 'prima facie' here, because as with 
wrongness and blameworthiness, there can be excuses: the ignorance of 
a child or a foreigner, or provocation. 
Suppose Emily says that it's irrational to smoke at all, but it's not 
impolite to smoke if you smoke in private. What is she doing, according 
to my theory? She's expressing her acceptance of norms that say not to 
smoke, but also not to be offended by private smoking. And isn't this 
pretty much what she wouM be doing if she said this? 
4. M O R A L  S E N T I M E N T S  
I characterize various different normative concepts, then, in terms of 
the different feelings that pertain to them. Now a frequent way of 
criticizing this way of doing things is to claim that we can't identify an 
emotion except in terms of beliefs. We can't understand, say, feeling 
offended without first having a descriptive characterization of impolite- 
ness. Simaott-Armstrong says, "We cannot identify anger or guilt 
phenomenologically or physiologically, because they feel different and 
have different physical causes and effects in different people at different 
times." If things were that bad, though, I'm baffled how we would ever 
have learned to speak about emotions. I think we're capable of a lot 
more self-monitoring than the mainstream of current anti-Humean 
emotion theory will allow. I don't now have to say "I did wrong, so this 
feeling must be guilt" -- although as with pain, to be sure, various 
external cues must have played a role in my learning term in the first 
place. Suppose, though, I have cause both for guilt mad for fear, and I 
have a bad feeling. I may be able to sort out whether this feels like guilt 
or like fear without establishing the etiology of my feeling, and without 
finding a proposition embedded in it. 
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Still, the theory of emotions is difficult and problematic. In the book 
I put forth what I called an "adaptive syndrome" view of emotions, but I 
also confronted some anthropological reports that seemed hard to 
square with this view. Anger pretty clearly has cross-cultural patterns 
and a continuity with animal emotions, but I was much more puzzled 
about guilt, and the distinction between guilt and shame. 9 
I very much want to resist any assumption that a psychic state must 
be a factual belief or else fit for the philosophical garbage pail. As time 
goes on we're getting more and more evidence that a big chunk of 
specifically human brain tissue ties social cues to bodily feelings, and 
that damage to these areas can cripple a person for social, human 
living, without degrading such things as performance on IQ tests. 1° And 
so I'm finding myself better confirmed now than when I wrote the book 
in my speculation that places moral judgment among these intricate 
workings. 
I'd expect, then, that by evolutionary design, different felt bodily 
reactions will go with different mechanisms for dealing with social cues, 
and for prompting the kinds of motivation that, with our ancestors, 
tended to promote reproduction when such cues were received. That 
won't mean that these mechanisms are currently adaptive, it should 
be stressed, especially in the strict biological sense. (We know, for 
instance, that educated people in rich industrial societies have a low 
rate of what evolutionary biologists call "reproductive success".) But 
there will be lots of specific emotional mechanisms that were shaped 
intricately by the Darwinian selection pressures of proto-human social 
life. And there's no reason to think that these mechanisms either fit 
neatly a cognitivist's picture of knower and facts known, or can be 
pushed outside the scope of human discussion and reasoning. 
Of course even if this rough picture of human emotions is true as far 
as it goes, it leaves big psychological and philosophical questions: 
Where, if anywhere, does moral judgment appear in such a picture, and 
where do other kinds of normative judgment appear? What are the 
roles of social learning in the workings of these mechanisms? Clearly 
discussion and linguistically encoded thought have important roles, and 
I think that coordination -- in Thomas Schelling's very broad sense -- 
will be a crucial part of the story. 11 But are adaptive emotional 
mechanisms one by one subject to the kind of control that I've been 
324 A L L A N  G I B B A R D  
calfing normative governance? Social learning will have ~mportant 
effects on the workings of these mechanisms, and I've schematized this 
learning under two broad headings: what I call "internalizing" norms 
when one is in situations in which the norms apply, and what I call 
"accepting" norms, as a result of normative discussion and internal 
rehearsal for normative discussion. 12 The real story, though, will 
doubtless be farmore complex than this. I don't put forth my speculations 
about feelings and accepting norms, then, as something we should 
accept or expect later to accept. I do think, though, that my schema 
makes a better starting point for further investigation than the belief- 
desire explanations that philosophers currently find so appealing. 
5. O B J E C T I V I T Y  
I spend a long time in the book asking what kinds of objectivity an 
expressivist like me can claim for his normative judgments. Suppose I 
accept the norm "Value accomplishment for its own sake." What distin- 
guishes my thinking this a demand of rationality from my regarding it as 
an existential commitment? I said the distinction is a matter of the 
higher order norms one accepts. I might accept higher order norms that 
permit me to reject this norm, and in that case, I regard valuing 
accomplishment as an existential commitment of mine. If, on the other 
hand, I accept higher order norms that tells everyone, mandatorily, to 
accept this norm, then I think valuing accomplishment to be a demand 
of rationality. 
Now even if my second order norms are universal and mandatory in 
form, Sinnott-Armstrong objects, I might accept third order norms that 
permitted rejecting nay second order norms -- and then I wouldn't 
regard valuing accomplishment as an objective demand of rationality. 
Don't I, then, get myself into an infinite regress of higher and higher 
order norms? 
The criticism is a good one; it demands rethinking. What I now want 
to venture is this: We don't ordinarily come to accept norms of any very 
high order at all. Mostly we just don't think in terms of higher order 
norms; the question of the status of the norms we accept doesn't come 
up. Now if a person accepts only base order norms, it seems ['air to say 
that he hasn't formed any explicit opinion about the objectivity of any 
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of his normative judgments. If he unreflectively demands their accept- 
ance on the part of everyone around, then he does treat the norms he 
accepts as objective, but he does so unreflectively. Take next the case 
where he explicitly accepts second order norms that require everyone 
to accept his ground order norms. Suppose he treats these second- 
order norms as objective, and does so unreflectively. Then shouldn't we 
say that he explicitly thinks his ground order norms to be objective? 
The default option, in effect, is to say that one unreflectively treats 
one's norms as objective. Treating something as an existential commit- 
ment, after all, is a highly self-conscious thing to do. Take, then, the 
highest order norms a person accepts. If he is disposed unreflectively to 
make conversational demands on others on behalf of these norms, then 
he unreflectively treats them as objective. Proceed downwards in a 
chain, then, from these highest order norms he accepts, through a set of 
norms he accepts at each level down to the second. Suppose that the 
norms in the set at each of these levels require everyone to accept the 
norms in the set at the level below. Then he explicitly regards all the 
norms in the sets below the top level as objective. If instead he accepts 
a norm but there is no such chain leading down to it, then he regards 
the norm as in some way non-objective --  perhaps in quite a recondite 
way. 
The regress, then, stops at the highest level of norms that he accepts. 
These he does not explicitly think objective or non-objective, though he 
may treat them unreflectively as objective. Below that level, he may 
explicitly regard various norms he accepts as objective, or he may 
explicitly regard them as in some way non-objective. Whether he 
regards a norm as objective depends on whether the right kind of finite 
chain descends to it from higher order norms he treats as objective 
unreflectively. 
All this, I admit, is overelaborate as a description of how we actually 
think. But it does show that no logical paradox lies hidden in the 
possibility of thinking various norms one accepts to be objective or not. 
One could, then, come to have explicit, consistent convictions on the 
matter. 
This and many of Sinnott-Armstrong's criticisms bear on the broad 
question, What does psychological reality have to do with content and 
with logic? This question raises a whole complex of philosophical 
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puzzles ,  puzzles  that  a re  ex t rao rd ina r i ly  vexing. The  ques t ion  appl ies  to 
s tr ict ly factual  beliefs,  and  it appl ies  to  wha tever  o the r  k inds  of  psychic  
states may  mimic  factual  be l ie f  is var ious  ways.  I ndeed  this b r o a d  
puzzle ,  we  might  say, m a k e s  for  the cent ra l  c luster  of  p r o b l e m s  that  
cu r ren t  ph i l o sophy  is tackling.  I can ' t  h o p e  to have  got ten  far  with these  
p rob l ems ,  e i ther  in m y  b o o k  o r  here .  
I d o  insist, though,  that  we  shou ldn ' t  a p p l y  a doub le  s t anda rd ,  ta lking 
as if these  mat te r s  were  u n p r o b l e m a t i c  in the  case  o f  factual  befiefs,  and  
so p r o b l e m a t i c  on ly  for  quasi-bel iefs ,  as we might  say: psychic  s tates  
that  mimic  factual  bel iefs  but  a ren ' t  factual  bel iefs  in the  fullest  sense.  
To  call for  a single s tandard ,  though,  is no t  to solve these  this c luster  of  
p rob lems .  W e  ph i l o sophe r s  have  w o r k  to do,  and  incisive cr i t ic isms l ike 
S inno t t -Arms t rong ' s  advance  the  w o r k  greatly.  I h o p e  I 've  been  able  to 
suggest,  though,  at  var ious  points ,  why I might  want  to go a long 
different  pa ths  f rom the  ones  his c o m m e n t a r y  seems to suggest, t3 
NOTES 
1 I argue this at length in Gibbard (1992a). 
2 If, as I do, we interpret R. M. Hare as an expressivist (see Gibbard, 1988), then, we 
can say, the classic statement of loose expressivism is Hare (1970). See also Blackbuna 
11984, 189--196) and (1988). 
Nor do some of Sinnott-Armstrong's other purported counterexamples work against 
this particular internalist claim: The claim isn't that beliefs in rational permissibility 
must motivate. And it certainly isn't that the motivations of normative governance must 
prevail. 
See Gibbard (1992a) for further discussion along this line. 
5 Foot (1958, 102--105). 
6 See Trilling (I 972) for a fine discussion of this. 
7 Goffman (1959). 
8 I am grateful to Sin-Yee Chan for giving me a set of fascinating Confucian quotations 
about ritual and related matters. The subject looks extremely rich, and I wish I knew 
more about it. 
9 The book reads at one point as if I end up just rejecting the adaptive syndrome view, 
but this is misleading. "If," I say, "emotional conceptions differ as much as" certain 
"reports suggest, that seems to spoil the view of guilt and shame as distinct biological 
adaptations. The explanation of what these emotions are cannot be the one I have 
sketched" (t41). I did regard the initial if as genuine, and indeed I'd regard it as a 
bigger if now than when I wrote the passage. Note too that my doubts were about guilt 
and shame; I can't find serious reasons for doubting that anger is a matter of an 
adaptiv.e syndrome. (The psychologists Schacter and Singer (1962) adopt a theory that 
may be hard to square with this, and seem to talk as if the experiments they report 
demand a theory like theirs. I myself find the connection of their experiments to their 
theory quite tenuous.) 
10 See esp. Saver and Damasio (1991). 
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11 Schelling (1960, Chap. 2). 
12 Both states are motivational, on my telling, but only accepting a norm involves 
"normative governance". 
~3 This work was supported by a Guggenheim Fellowship, for which I am very grateful. 
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